from the object to the exactly repeatable and therefore 
     seemingly permanent verbal formula. An essence, in fact, 
     is not part of the object but part of its definition. Also, I 
     believe, the well-known notions of substance and 
     attributable qualities can be derived from this operational 
     dependence upon exactly repeatable verbal descriptions 
     and definitions—for the very linear order in which words 
     have to be used results in a syntactical time order 
     analysis of qualities that actually are simultaneous and 
     so intermingled and interrelated that no quality can be 
     removed from one of the bundles of qualities we call 
     objects without changing both it and all the other 
     qualities. After all, a quality is only a quality of a group of 
     other qualities, and if you change anyone of the group 
     they all necessarily change. Whatever the situation may 
     be from the point of view of a verbalist analysis, from the